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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OIF UTAH 
HART BROTHERS MUSIC I 
COMPANY, a corporation, ·. 
Pla.intiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
LILE R. WOOD, ALL-AMERICAN )
1 
CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendan.ts and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9675 
BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff's action to rescind a contract for the sale of 
a piano based on fraud, return or possession of the piano, 
together with rental value or, in the alternative, for 
judgment for the market value of the piano. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the 
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, District Judge, in favor 
of the Defendant, Lile R. Wood, and against the Plain-
tiff, no cause of action. The case was tried to the court 
without a jury. Judgment also was entered in favor of 
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the plaintiff against the defendant, All-American Credit 
Card Corporation. 
STATEMENT OF F.A!CTS 
The plaintiff corporation was engaged in the music 
business, part of which consisted of the sale of pianos. 
The defendant, All-American Credit Card Corporation, 
sold credit cards to the public which could be used at cer-
tain specified businesses in the general area of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, one of which was the plaintiff corporation. 
The defendant, Lile R. Wood, was president of All-
American Credit Card Corporation. After a purchase 
and sale, the business establishment would be paid, less 
a discount by All-American. 
On Deeember 31, 1959, defendant Wood made a pur-
chase of a piano from the plaintiff using one of the eredit 
cards. Plaintiff subsequently presented its bill to All-
American, which has remained unpaid. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
RULING NO CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO 
RESPONDENT, LILE R. WOOD. 
(a) Pla.intijf failed to establish sufficient ev~­
dence of frarud on the part of respondent. 
There is no doubt that plaintiff's sole remedy in this 
case is against the All-American Credit Card Corpora-
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tion, unless it can prove that at the time of the transac-
tion in question respondent acted in such a fraudulent 
manner so as to create liability on his part. 
To prove respondent guilty of fraud plaintiff must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he made a 
representation which was material to the transaction, 
and which was false. Plaintiff must also prove that re-
spondent knew that such representation was false, that 
the plaintiff was ignorant of the falsity of such repre-
sentation, and that it was relied upon as true. Plaintiff 
must establish that it had a right to rely on said represen-
tation and as a result of such reliance was consequently 
and proximately injured. Stuck v. Delta Land & Water 
Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791. 
At this point let us review the testimony of Reed L. 
Hart, the agent of plaintiff who consummated the transac-
tion. This testimony of Mr. Hart, which should be the 
most favorable plaintiff has to offer, was given under 
direct examination. Mr. Hart's testimony as to what 
was said and done on this particular day is found on 
pages 6 and 7 of the Transcript and is reprinted in plain-
tiff's brief on appeal. 
Subtracting from the testimony of Mr. Hart his con-
versation with Mr. Donaldson (contents of which were un-
known to respondent) and plaintiff's attorney's attempt 
to testify by means of comment and leading questions, 
the only comment made by respondent to Mr. Hart in 
regard to payment is found on page 7 of the transcript, 
line 18, when he was told by respondent that they would 
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be paid ''Just as soon as you send the bill into the 
Company.'' 
This statement is no more than an opinion on the 
part of respondent reflecting the published policy of the 
Corporation. Placing oneself in the shoes of respond-
ent at this time, not two months later when the parties 
could look back at what had transpired in the meantime, 
let us see why respondent would have such an opinion. 
At the directors meeting on the previous day, $5,500.00 
in cash had been pledged for payment of dealers' 
accounts. Also secondary sources of income were avail-
able. This was to be accomplished by taking the com-
mercial paper which resulted from the purchases of card 
holders from the various dealers, and pledging or dis-
counting such paper with a financial institution. Look-
ing then at this statement made by respondent at that 
point of time, it is entirely reasonable to assume that 
respondent expected that the dealers' accounts would 
shortly be paid. 
Another factor that should be taken into considera-
tion is that Mr. Hart had talked at length with Mr. Don-
aldson, the General Manager of the Credit Card Corpo-
ration, about the methods by which payment would he 
made. There is no indication that Mr. Hart relied in any 
way upon the statement made by respondent. Mr. Hart 
had talked with Mr. Donaldson, who was active in the 
direct management of the ~credit Card Corporation, who 
knew more about the operation and condition of the Com-
pany than did respondent who devoted only a few hours 
a month to the Company. 
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Therefore, taking plaintiff's most favorable testi-
mony, we can see that only one statement was made by 
respondent in regard to payment of the account. That 
statement was but a matter of opinion on the speaker's 
part; he did not regard the statement as false or mis-
leading. There is no proof that plaintiff relied on this 
statement, in fact, it is very possible that the statement 
was not given until after the contract was written up. 
(b) The reviewing Court must view the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the verdict: 
The above statement is a very well-established prin-
ciple in appellate law and has been upheld in many cases 
in this jurisdiction. Toomer's Estate v. Un.ion Pacific 
Railroad Co., 239 P. 2d 163; Hillgard v. Utah By-Prod-
ucts, 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 289; Coombs v. Perry,. 2 
Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 680. 
A statement on this subject in Hadley v. Wood, 9 
Utah 2d 366, best states respondent's position. 
"Undoubtedly if we viewed the evidence in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, as seems to be 
done in his brief, the evidence could be regarded 
as supporting that conclusion. However, in re-
viewing the case upon appeal, it is our duty t9 
survey the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict." 
CONCLUSION 
Without further belaboring the matter, the Supreme 
Court has frequently admonished litigants it would not 
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reverse the finding of the trial court unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against those findings. The trial 
court had many advantages not available to the appellate 
court, not the least of which was the opportunity to 
visually inspect the witnesses and evidence as presented. 
Conservatively speaking, the least to be said about the 
evidence in this case is that the trial court's factual find-
ings are not unreasonable and they should he sustained 
on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake !City 11, Utah 
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Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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